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Abstract: Communicative action is the coordination mechanism of social actions. 
However, being a social action itself, it needs coordination in case of obstruction. Such 
obstruction is especially frequent in late modern constellation burdened with the 
“individualization of life forms” (Beck) and the “dissolution of a mutual ground” 
(Lash). I call the mechanism capable of overcoming such obstruction the “coordination 
of action coordination.” In the following essay, this notion is elaborated. Firstly, on the 
level of formal pragmatics, situations that implicate action coordination are specified. 
Secondly, the coordinating mechanism of action coordination is elaborated in the frames 
of the Habermasian theory as the harmonization of different concepts of justice 
underlying action coordination. Thirdly, a paradoxical aspect of this solution is 
introduced, which originates from the strict linguistic-intentional character of 
Habermas’s theory.  Fourthly, based on Levinas’s pre-intentional ethical 
phenomenology, an alternative description of the coordination of action coordination is 
elaborated. Finally, the broader theoretical consequences of the new solution are 
detailed. 
 






In one of his recent essays, Honneth evaluates the different postmodern philosophical 
projects from the perspective of the Habermasian discourse ethics (2007). He argues that the 
attempts of authors like Lyotard or Stephen K. White to overcome the limitedness of Kantian 
moral philosophy by leaving behind the questions of justice are unsuccessful. As these 
attempts can be reformulated within discourse ethics, which is a rephrasing of the Kantian 
ideas, they cannot reach their goal. However, other postmodern authors, like Levinas or 
Derrida, provide new perspectives beyond the horizon of Kantian moral philosophy. Their 
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most important ethical notion, human care (Fürsorge), refers to an alternative source of 
morality, “the other” of the cognitive, universalistic notion of justice.  
On the foundational level of the Habermasian communication theory and social philosophy 
lies the concept of discourse ethics. The key notion of Habermas’s thinking, communicative 
action, is supplemented by a theory of justice, as the willingness to pursue an undistorted 
discourse depends on the actors’ moral perspective. That is where Honneth’s idea becomes 
important: if an alternative concept of morality can be introduced based on the notion of care 
(instead of justice), it has consequences for all communication theories rooted in a moral 
philosophy based on the notion of justice. All of them – including the whole Habermasian 
theory – could be revised from the new moral perspective as questions arise: What is the 
relation of the two types of morality (complementary, ambiguous, or conflicting)? How and 
in what situations do they interfere? 
In the following essay, an attempt will be made for such a revision by introducing a 
phenomenon wherein the two types of morality complement each other. In The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas elaborates a synthesis of a phenomenological and a system 
theoretic answer to the question of how social action is possible. While on the 
phenomenological level, the coordination of social action is explained with the harmonization 
of the actors’ meanings, on the system theoretic level, it is explained with the non-linguistic 
mediums. According to Habermas, mutual understanding is a phenomenological 
presupposition of social actions. It is basically guaranteed by a common lifeworld of the 
actors, which provides the same unreflected interpretation of a situation. In situations where 
this common horizon is not pre-given, an explicit effort is needed to create it. This effort is 
referred to as communicative action, a process of coming to an agreement concerning the 
interpretation of the situation. In this sense, communicative action is the mechanism of action 
coordination, complementary of the lifeworld. Simultaneously, communicative action is not 
just the coordinating mechanism of social actions; it is a social action on its own as well. 
Therefore, questions concerning its coordination mechanism may legitimately be posed. How 
can the situation be described when action coordination is obstructed? And how can the 
mechanism be described that may solve this disturbance?  
In the late modern constellation, these questions are becoming especially important, as the 
life paths individualize (Beck 1992) and “difference” becomes the ground (Lash 1999). In 
this constellation, not only the mutual lifeworld dissolves but the frames of those 
communicative processes are also weakened, which is supposed to recreate a mutual horizon. 
Despite these diagnoses, Habermas himself did not pose questions concerning the obstruction 
of action coordination. Therefore, the following attempt will be made to fill this gap. I will 
argue that these questions lead to the fundamental problems of meaning formulation – to the 
problem of “coordinating action coordination” – and may be answered only by leaving the 
Habermasian concept of morality based solely on justice and stepping back to the alternative 
source of morality carefully analyzed by Levinas. 
In what follows, firstly, the problem of coordinating action coordination will be elaborated by 
briefly evoking Habermas’s formal pragmatics. The problem will be introduced as the 
interruption of a series of speech acts constituting the communicative action and resulting 
from the discrepancies of the actors’ concepts of justice defining the order of speech acts. 
Secondly, a harmonization process will be shortly outlined solely within the Habermasian 
frames. To describe the mechanism that coordinates action coordination and to elaborate a 
linguistic-intentional solution, the dynamics of moral development (discussed in the 
discourse ethics) are recalled. Accordingly, the coordination of action coordination may be 
introduced as a harmonization of the underlying concepts of justice. Thirdly, the limits of the 
linguistic-intentional solution will be pointed out, and a new approach potentially 
transcending them will be outlined. At this point, Levinas’s ideas on the moral obligation 
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invoked by the experience of the Face of the Other will be applied in order to describe a 
mechanism capable of reestablishing the moral basis of speech acts. Finally, in the 
concluding remarks, the broader theoretical consequences of this solution will be outlined.1 
 
 
The problem of coordinating action coordination 
 
The Theory of Communicative Action is grounded on the level of formal pragmatics, that is, 
on the level of a theory of mutual understanding. Habermas describes the conditions of 
mutual understanding by reconstructing the potential sequence of speech acts. The 
reconstruction results in a script, which might end either in the suspension of the 
communication or in the mutual acceptance of the validity claims of a speech act, that is 
mutual understanding.   
 
Table 1: Undistorted sequence of speech acts 
rounds/ speakers speaker “A”  speaker “B” 
1. round formulates speech act “p” → 
raises validity claims (what 
she is saying is true and 
right and she is truthful) 
 
2. round  either accepts the validity 
claims of “p”→ mutual 
understanding (successful 
ending of communication) 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “p” → formulates 
speech act “q”  
3. round either accepts the validity 
claims of “q”→ revokes “p” 
→ mutual understanding 
(successful ending of 
communication) 
 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “q” → formulates 
speech act “r” 
4. round  either accepts the validity 
claims of “r”→ revokes “q” 
→mutual understanding 
(successful ending of 
communication) 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “r” → formulates 
speech act “s” 
5. round etc.  
 
Table 1 shows such a script: every time a speech act is formulated, three validity claims are 
raised, which claims can be accepted (resulting in the new consensus) or refused (resulting in 
a new speech act that raises three validity claims that can be accepted or refused etc.). In case 
of undistorted communicative action this sequence is continued until a speech act is mutually 
accepted and a common interpretation of the situation is born. However, this sequence may 
be interrupted in at least two ways. Firstly, one of the speakers may willingly shift from the 
action oriented to mutual understanding to the strategic use of language. The latter may take 
the shape of open violence (threat) or hidden violence (manipulation, lie). In these cases 
                                                 
1 The main argument of the article concerning the synthesis of Habermas’ and Levinas’ concepts has been 
elaborated in a socialization theoretical context in my book A modernizáció ingája (Sik 2012). This time 
however, the problem of coordinating action coordination is analyzed from a communication and social 
theoretical perspective. 
Sik, D.                                                                                                                                       30 
 
 
action coordination is blocked due to reasons external to the communication (i.e. the intention 
of an actor) so the process may be restored by eliminating the external reason.  
The second, less obvious case is connected to the limited rationality of the lifeworld, to 
dogmatic meanings. A meaning is called dogmatic if it is not open to critical evaluation, that 
is, if it is sustained without proper justification. Dogmatic meanings are originally acquired 
through distorted communicative processes and as such, they can not be justified with 
rational arguments.2 At this point it is important to emphasize that according to Habermas’ 
theory (and to the late Wittgenstein’s heritage) meanings are not closed units of sense that 
can be either dogmatic or open to criticism per se. Instead they are born and exist only in 
interactions, therefore they are valid only for the actors and only during the given action 
situation. Furthermore, in addition to knowing the rules of its use, knowing a meaning 
includes knowing its justification as well.3 Accordingly in this theoretical setting dogmatism 
is neither the characteristic of the meaning itself (because meanings are embedded in 
situations) nor that of the actor (because meanings are created in interactions not by single 
subjects), but belongs to the interaction it is born in. Dogmatism is a characteristic of the 
process within which the meanings are formulated, i.e. it is a characteristic of the sequence of 
speech acts. It shows itself by causing a rupture in the sequence: it occurs when one of the 
speakers holds on to her speech act without being able to justify it with rational arguments. In 
this case the other speaker is hindered in continuing the series because neither was her speech 
act accepted, nor has she anything to accept or refuse. 
 
Table 2: Full sequence of speech acts 
rounds/ speakers speaker “A”  speaker “B”  
1. round formulates speech act “p” → 
raises validity claims (what 
she is saying is true and 
right and she is truthful) 
 
2. round  either accepts the validity 
claims of “p”→ mutual 
understanding (successful 
ending of communication) 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “p” → formulates 
speech act “q”  
3. round either accepts the validity 
claims of “q”→ revokes “p” 
→ mutual understanding 
(successful ending of 
communication) 
 
or refuses one of the validity 
claims of “q” → formulates 
speech act “r” 
or changes to open or hidden 
violence → willing 
interruption of 
communicative action → 
unsuccessful ending of 
                                                 
2 Communicative action is not only a mechanism of action coordination, but it is the mechanism of reproducing 
the different aspects of lifeworld as well (that is socialization, cultural reproduction and social integration). 
Hence the distortion of communicative action leaves its mark on these processes potentially causing 
psychopathologies, loss of meaning and anomie (Habermas 1987: 143). Habermas discusses the problem of 
dogmatic meanings extensively in his essay Reflections on Communicative Pathology (1998). There he argues 
that the occurrence of this phenomenon is most probable in families characterized by asymmetric power-
structure, by the impossibility of open discussion of conflicts.  
3 This is a key idea of The Theory of Communicative Action, because Habermas establishes his whole theory of 
rationality on the basis of an accountable actor capable and willing to justify her actions (1984: 22). Only an 
actor capable and willing to justify her motives can participate in the above sketched sequence of speech acts. 




or refuses “q” without 
justifying “p” (i.e. without 
formulating speech act “r”) 
→ unwilling interruption of 
communicative action  
4. round  ??? 
 
 
Table 2 shows all possible variations of the sequence including the two types of distortion. As 
mentioned before, the willing interruption of communicative action may be corrected by 
eliminating its cause external to the communication (i.e. by changing the intention of the 
actor). However, in case of unintended interruption, the correction is far more complicated. In 
this case the cause of the interruption is not external to the communication. The speakers are 
probably willing to continue their action oriented to mutual understanding, when they face 
the unexpected disturbance of communication: a speech act whose validity claim is not 
accepted, and which is in the same time sustained but unjustified. It is important to see, that at 
this point of interruption the pragmatic order of communication is damaged: sustaining 
without justifying a speech act is a pragmatic paradox, a violation of the very rules of 
communication. This violation mirrors a dissent concerning the fundamental structure 
underlying the order of speech acts. It expresses that the speaker does not perceive the other 
as someone to whom she is obliged either to justify or to give up her validity claim. 
Consequently, it may be stated that in fact it is an attribute of the actors’ relationship that is 
responsible for the interruption. As the relationship of the speakers is an inherent feature of 
the interaction, the cause of the interruption is internal to communication. As such, unlike in 
case of willing interruption of communicative action, the unintended interruption may be 
corrected only within the frames of communication, by special interactions. In this sense, 
unlike in the first case, the unintended interruption does not necessarily lead to the ending of 
the communication; it may be successfully treated within its frames. 
To describe the exact nature of such a correcting mechanism, two questions have to be 
answered. Firstly the nature of the fundamental structure underlying the order of speech acts 
has to be specified. Secondly the mechanism capable of reestablishing communication has to 
be outlined. In the following section I will elaborate an answer to these questions, leaning on 
Habermas’ early reception of psychoanalysis and later ideas on discourse ethics. 
 
 
The coordination mechanism of action coordination 
 
Even if he does not explicitly analyze the problem of coordinating action coordination, in his 
early major book, Knowledge and Human Interest, Habermas discusses a structurally 
analogous problem (1971). In this book, he attempts to differentiate the critical social theory 
from other social sciences by specifying its underlying interest, the “emancipatory interest.” 
To describe the emancipatory interest, Habermas carefully analyzes the interest underlying 
psychoanalytic therapy. In the therapeutic situation, the therapist and patient share the same 
goal of critically reflecting on the patient’s meanings and reformulating the ones being born 
in distorted communication. Therefore, psychoanalytic therapy serves not only as a model of 
identifying the restrained elements of the lifeworld, the results of distorted communicative 
socialization, but also as a model of overcoming the dogmatism by a re-socialization 
process.4 This re-socialization process is basically an undistorted communicative action 
                                                 
4 This mixing of praxis and theory was criticized by many commentators. Thomas McCarthy mentions for 
example that the synthesis of the basically theoretical-epistemological ideas of Kant and Hegel and the mainly 
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serving the purpose of reevaluating the meanings by the standards of communicative 
rationality. Those meanings that were originally formulated in distorted communication are 
disapproved; those that were formulated in undistorted communication are maintained.5 
Albeit Habermas used psychoanalysis as an example of the praxis of critical social science, 
its application may be fruitful for our purposes as well. In my opinion, the problem of 
coordinating action coordination may be best approached in comparison with the 
psychoanalytic therapy. Therapy may be defined as a special social action situation wherein 
the de-dogmatization of certain meanings occurs. During therapy, the roles of the therapist 
and patient are mutually accepted, establishing a mutually accepted order of speech acts. The 
patient wants to overcome her dogmatic meanings, and to do so, she follows the instructions 
of the therapist. Accordingly, their relationship can be characterized as a legitimate authority 
(in the Weberian sense) that is a mutually recognized order. Based on her authority, the 
therapist can motivate the patient to face her meanings and judge them on the basis of their 
justifiability, even if it is difficult. At this point, the similarity and the difference between the 
therapy and the coordination of action coordination may be phrased. Both processes aim to 
open up the dogmatic lifeworld to criticism. In the first case, however, the frames of the 
emancipatory communication are well defined and mutually accepted, contrary to the second 
case in which these frames are absent. Therefore, the main question arising in processes of 
coordination of action coordination is as follows: How do we establish a legitimate order 
wherein the speaker has the mutually recognized right to motivate her partner either to resign 
or justify her speech acts? 
Habermas discusses the question of the order underlying the speech acts in his essay Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990). Therein he reconstructs the link between 
the Kohlbergian concept of moral development, the social perspectives, and the types of 
action coordination. Kohlberg identifies six levels of moral development, each characterized 
by a more general concept of justice.6 The concepts of justice determine the moral obligations 
of the subject. Moral obligations define, among others, the perception of the other and hereby 
the order of the speech acts. They determine to whom the subject is supposed to be obliged to 
either justify or resign her validity claims. Accordingly, the key to the problem of 
coordinating action coordination lies on the level of moral development. As described above, 
situations that require coordination of action coordination can be defined by an actor who 
does not recognize the other as someone to whom she is obliged to justify or resign her 
validity claims. According to Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, it may be 
claimed that these ruptures of communication are moral in nature. They occur if an actor’s 
concept of justice does not implicate the justification or the resignation of a validity claim in 
the given situation (i.e., in relation to her given partner). Thus, the dogmatic interruption of 
communicative action may be traced back to the narrowness of an actor’s concept of justice. 
Therefore, it may be corrected by changing the actor’s concept of justice.  
                                                                                                                                                        
practical ideas of Marx and Freud leads to the unfortunate illusion that Habermas tries to solve the problems of 
praxis and theory in the same time (1978: 96). 
5 In his book On the Logic of Social Sciences, Habermas formulates a similar idea opposing Gadamer’s position. 
There he argues that one’s prejudice-structure may be critically evaluated according to the quality of the 
processes of its formation (1989) 
6 On the pre-conventional level the concept of justice is either based on the complementarity of order and 
obedience, or the symmetry of compensation, the social perspective is egocentric and the interactions are 
motivated either by the authority or the self-interest. On the conventional level, the concept of justice can be 
characterized as a conformity to roles or system of norms, the social perspective is based on the primary group 
or the whole group, and accordingly the interactions are governed by the roles or the norms. On the post-
conventional level the concept of justice is either based on general or procedural principles, the other is seen as a 
“goal in itself”, and the interactions take the form of undistorted discourses (Habermas 1990: 166-167).  
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According to Kohlberg, moral development is a unilinear, cognitive learning process. This 
means that in the course of development, the individual has to gradually pass through all 
levels step by step. The transition to a higher level of moral development is motivated by 
frequent experience of the inadequacy of one’s concept of justice. The transition itself is 
realized in the series of moral discourses (Kohlberg 1981). So the changing of an actor’s 
concept of justice (the coordination of action coordination) may be described within these 
frames by characterizing these discourses.  
In situations where the coordination of action coordination becomes necessary, it is not one’s 
concept of justice in general but its narrowness that is responsible for the interruption. So this 
narrowness has to be altered, and the circle of people perceived as recognized communication 
partners (to whom the actor justifies or resigns her validity claims) has to be extended. 
Hence, in order to coordinate action coordination, the actor shall shift to a concept of a higher 
level of moral development. However, this level is not arbitrary; it has to be the proximate 
level because of the gradual nature of moral development. Furthermore, the shifting of a 
concept of justice, as any other mechanism of meaning formulation, is not a monological act 
but an interaction. This interaction may not take any shape; it has to be in accordance with the 
problematic actor’s concept of justice because this concept determines the maximal 
rationality of her action coordination. It may be concluded that the coordination mechanism 
of action coordination is an attempt to shift the actor’s problematic concept of justice to a 
higher level of moral development in the frames of an interaction according to her actual 
concept of justice. By repeating the original communicative action within the frames of a 
new, more general concept of justice, the cause of the former interruption may be eliminated, 
as the former unwillingness to either justify or resign a validity claim will presumably lose its 
ground in the new moral order. 
To clarify the concept, let us review an example. Habermas describes the situation wherein 
construction workers discuss the details of their midmorning snack and there is a debate 
between an older worker and a newcomer concerning the person who should bring the beers 
(Habermas 1987: 121). My example of coordinating action coordination is a variation of this 
scene. Let us suppose that the older worker and the newcomer not only disagree about who 
should bring the beer but in addition to this, their concepts of justice differ in a way that their 
action coordination is endangered. The newcomer is on the second level of moral 
development, which means that he thinks he is obliged to justify his validity claims only if it 
is in his best interest. In the present situation, he sees no reason why it would serve his 
interest if he explained to the older person his reason to refuse bringing beer, so he is simply 
rejecting the elder’s speech act without justifying the rejection, causing the interruption of 
communicative action. The older worker is on the third level of moral development, thinking 
that the roles define to whom one is obliged to justify his validity claims. So he tries to 
handle the situation by communicative means. To do so, he first has to establish the moral 
basis required for action coordination by attempting to change the newcomer’s concept of 
justice within a discourse according to the newcomer’s concept of justice. This means that the 
elder should prove to the newcomer that it is in his best interest to apply the symmetry of 
compensation to the more general level of roles (he may argue that it is worth more to 
compensate between roles than concrete persons, as it is a more stable, economic system). If 
the elder succeeds and the newcomer shifts to third level of moral development, the 
interrupted action coordination may be restarted (the newcomer now perceives the elder as a 
representative of a role to whom he is obliged to justify his validity claims) without the 
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The paradox of coordinating action coordination 
 
In the conclusion of the previous section I described the coordination of action coordination 
as an attempt to shift to a more general concept of justice by a moral debate according to the 
original, narrow concept of justice. In my opinion this conclusion leads to a paradox in a 
short way. The paradox is caused by the double role played by the concepts of justice in 
moral debates, which has not been taken seriously enough either by Kohlberg or by 
Habermas. Concepts of justice underlie every action coordination process by defining the 
moral perspectives of the actors. This causes a certain difficulty in case of debates on the 
concepts themselves. Within these debates, the concept of justice appears on two levels: on 
the formal level of the frame of the action coordination (it defines the moral basis of the form 
of the debate) and on the substantive level of the communication (it is the topic of the 
debate). So whenever an attempt is made to change the concept of justice, a paradoxical 
situation is generated.  
The action coordination process that aims to shift the underlying concept of justice to the 
higher level may never completely succeed because its actual, narrower underlying concept 
of justice inevitably leaves its mark on the new concept. Accordingly, within the frames of 
the purely cognitive-linguistic model, only an apparent moral transition may be grasped. To 
explain this statement the above mentioned features of meaning have to be evoked: knowing 
a meaning includes in addition to the knowledge of the rule of its use, the knowledge of its 
justification as well. Furthermore, the knowledge of justification depends on the original 
process of acquisition: the rationality of the original acquisitive action coordination 
determines the rationality of the justification (a meaning acquired in a distorted process 
cannot be rationally justified). Therefore a concept of justice that is acquired in action 
coordination according to a narrower concept of justice than itself can be justified only 
according to that narrower concept. However this implicates a paradoxical situation: the form 
of justification contradicts the justified proposition. In this sense if a speech act is expressed 
in order to justify a concept of justice acquired in action coordination according to a narrower 
concept of justice, a “performative contradiction”7 occurs: the way the speech act is expressed 
(in accordance with the narrow concept of justice) contradicts the expressed propositional 
content (the broader concept of justice).  
The above described example may clarify this conclusion. In case of the newcomer and elder 
workers who are on the second and third moral level of moral development the problem takes 
the following shape. The elder persuades the newcomer in action coordination according to 
the second level (by saying that it is worth to shift) to accept the order of roles. So the 
newcomer acquires a concept of justice according to the third level of moral development, 
but he can justify it only according to the second level (by arguing that it is better worth it). 
This means that the justifying speech act implicates a performative contradiction: by saying 
that it is worth better to compensate between roles than particular individuals, two 
contradicting concepts of justice is expressed. The form of the argument is based on the 
egocentric perspective while the justified proposition concerns the role based perspective. As 
a matter of fact this justification attests that it is still the second level of moral development 
that determines the newcomer’s moral perspective not the third, as it implicates that in case it 
is not worth it anymore the role based concept loses its validity. 
It is important to emphasize that the conventional concept of justice held for pre-conventional 
reasons does not simply express a “variant of conventional morality”. Instead, as it is 
grounded on a lower level of moral development, actually it expresses a pre-conventional 
                                                 
7 The notion has been elaborated by Apel and Habermas, it occurs when a “speech act k(p) rests on non-
contingent presuppositions whose propositional content contradicts the asserted proposition p” (Habermas 1990: 
80) 
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concept of justice. At the end, it is the reason used in the moral debates that matters: unlike in 
case of the truth based or aesthetic meanings, in case of moral issues, the way of arguing 
itself implies a concept of justice. This creates the chance of a contradiction between the logic 
of argumentation and the expressed concept of justice, which occurs between actors 
characterized by diverging level of moral development.     
In my opinion, from this paradox follows a need for revising Habermas’ theory.8 Since the 
transition between concepts of justice can not be grasped within its frames, its completion 
becomes necessary. In order to find out the direction of the completion, the nature of the 
paradox has to be further clarified. The paradox is basically caused by the limitation of the 
circle of possible meaning-formation processes. In Habermas’ theory meanings are born and 
renewed in interactions motivated by the need to solve a dissent in social action situations. 
More precisely it could be said that he focuses only on these meanings and these meaning-
formulation processes. However these processes have philosophically elaborated alternatives 
and some of these alternatives may be fruitfully used in order to resolve the paradox. The 
wanted alternative meaning-formulation process is required to have two important 
characteristics: first it has to express a mutually accepted equivalent of a high level concept 
of justice (that may serve as a possible basis for a linguistic formulation of the new concept 
of justice), secondly it has to be non-linguistic (to avoid the paradox).9 With other words, the 
wanted alternative is a moral meaning originating from a source that is different from 
cognitive-intentional justice. This is the point where the postmodern ethics could be 
connected to the cognitive theory of justice. In his phenomenological writings Levinas 
describes a meaning-formulation process that seems to satisfy these conditions. So in the 
following section his relevant ideas will be shortly introduced serving as a potential solution 
to the paradox. 
 
 
The Face of the Other and elementary ethics  
 
In his most important philosophical works Levinas aims to describe a special experience, the 
birth of a set of meanings, namely our elementary ethical meanings.10 In Totality and Infinity 
he approaches the problem by identifying two complementary sources of meaning, the 
domain of “the Same” and the domain of “the Other”. The Same (or “the Being”) has been 
the main object of philosophical investigation from the ancient Greek to Heidegger, and 
                                                 
8 Crossley also argues in many articles that the Habermasian theory needs further grounding by 
phenomenologies focusing on the bodily and affective phenomena. He argues that The Theory of 
Communicative Action lacks a theory of affections and a theory of the body, which parts could be elaborated 
according to the ideas of Merleau-Ponty (Crossley 1996, 1998). In the following section I also lean on an author, 
whose ideas are deeply connected with the late phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. 
9 In another context Habermas discusses the problem of the pre-linguistic basis of communicative action. He 
leans on Durkheim’s ideas on the non-verbal ritual practices constituting the sacred roots of morality. In these 
rites the individual experiences the society itself that is they become a subject of a pre-linguistic meaning-
formation process expressing a moral consensus (Habermas 1987: 52-53). However, Habermas discusses these 
ideas in a historical perspective, in order to identify the evolutionary step preceding the shift to linguistic 
foundation of moral consensus described by Mead. This is the reason why Durkheim’s ideas can not be used to 
our purpose, namely that they represent a historically exceeded stage (the ritual practices of the tribes).  
10 Levianas is often criticized – similarly to other post-structuralist French authors – that his writings are lacking 
clear argumentation, obscure and therefore unscientific. I think that this criticism misses the point. Levinas’ 
purpose is to give a description of a rare, pre-intentional moral experience. That can be done – because of the 
pre-intentional nature of the experience – only in a metaphorical language, which is often closer to poetry than 
to strict philosophical argumentation. However, this does not mean of course that it is lacking any logical 
structure. In this article my aim is not to critically evaluate Levinas’ thoughts, but to use them as a description of 
a rare moral experience, which helps me to solve the Habermasian paradox.  
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accordingly ontology has been the first philosophy. Levinas’ goal is to analyze the alternative 
source of meaning, the Other, and to establish the frames of a new phenomenology whose 
main concern is not the world, but the Other, and whose starting point is not ontology but 
ethics.  
In Totality and Infinity Levinas reconstructs two different kinds of attachment to the world, 
the enjoyment (“living from…”) and the economy (possession, habitation and labor). Our 
original attachment to the world is pre-intentional: we live from it, that is, we are enjoying the 
elements of life (the food, the warm weather etc.). This attachment is completed by the 
intentional economy that is motivated by the urge to gain control over the enjoyable elements 
by producing them. Enjoyment and labor share the same feature of expressing the mastery of 
subject over the elements of life. Even if the subject depends on the elements of life as they 
potentially suffer from their absence, she is master to them as she gives sense to the elements 
by placing them into her meaning-structure. The identification of this feature enables Levinas 
to introduce the alternative of the elements of life. He describes a special experience that 
refuses to be contained, that is, to be placed in a meaning-structure. The source of this 
experience is the Face of the Other.  
The Face resists any attempt to be identified, as it identifies itself, overwrites the meanings 
tried to be attached to it.11 In this sense the Face expresses a meaning from the moment it is 
perceived as a Face. This meaning is a warning that signifies the limits of one’s power, 
expressing that it can not be extended on the Other the same way as on the elements of life.12 
It is an imperative that raises an unavoidable decision: the meaning expressed in the 
experience of the Face may be neglected or may be taken seriously. According to Levinas 
this decision is the root of every ethics as the choosing of the recognition of the Other 
implicates an absolute responsibility, an imperative of turning to the other.13 This 
responsibility effects the subject’s attachment to the elements of life as well. The two earlier 
options – instant consumption or accumulation – are competed by a third option, namely the 
sharing of the elements of life (in literal sense and in the sense of sharing the meanings). In 
this sense the elementary ethics provides a concept different from the ethics of justice. While 
justice – since Kant’s categorical imperative – is organized around the principle of 
universality, elementary responsibility is based on particularity. It expresses a devotion to 
some particular other, which devotion includes even self-sacrifice if necessary.  
At this point it is a central question under what circumstances the Face may be perceived and 
how this process may be described. Levinas examines these questions in detail in his second 
major book Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence (1998). Unlike in his first book, here he 
plays down the discussion of the relation of the Other and the elements of life. He focuses 
instead on the description of the constitution of elementary responsibility. Accordingly here 
his main distinction refers not to “the Same and the Other”, but to the two aspects of language 
use, “the said and the saying”.14 The said expresses the Being, and the saying expresses what 
is beyond this domain. In this sense the saying is the source of different meanings, which are 
expressed in the act of saying itself. The saying unlike the said can not be characterized as an 
emission of signs. Instead, in the saying the subjects expose, denude themselves to the Other. 
However, the exposure is not an action of the subject as actions implicate interests, that is, 
                                                 
11 As Levinas emphasizes it, the Face is not a phenomenon but an enigma (Peperzak 1998: 116). 
12 Levinas uses the word “murder” to express the weight of the rejection of the experience of the Face: to treat 
the Other as an element of life is to kill her, as killing is only possible if the Other is treated as an object 
(Levinas: 1969: 232-233).    
13 This responsibility has been called by some philosophers – according to the sense Merleau-Ponty used the 
expression “wild” – “wild responsibility” (Tengelyi 2004: 123). 
14 With this step Levinas gives a completely new sense to the expression “phenomenological reduction”, he 
means by it the “epoche of the said” (that leads to the analysis of the saying). For a detailed analysis of the 
distinction see Waldenfels’ essay, “Levinas on the Saying and the Said” (2005) 
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they concern the domain of Being. The exposure of the subject is the result of her passivity, 
as passivity allows the absolute offering of oneself to the Other, the “substitution”, the 
“pledge of taking the pain of the Other”. In this sense only passivity allows pure proximity, 
wherein the experience of the Face is possible and the elementary responsibility may be 
born.15  
Accordingly elementary responsibility is not the result of a process of intentional meaning-
formation (either monological or interactive), but the result of passive, unintentional 
meaning-expression, the result of the proximity of two subjects. The responsibility expressed 
in proximity is absolute (that is, it implicates the complete subordination of oneself for the 
Other). Therefore it has to be limited in the very moment when a third subject appears. The 
appearance of “the third” leads from the elementary ethics to the domain of society and 
politics. The limitation of the absolute responsibility takes the shape of cognitive concepts of 
justice. Accordingly every elaborated theory of justice (political or moral philosophy) can be 
treated as the limited, cognitive explication of the elementary ethics. 
The inevitable limitation of elementary responsibility explains why the experience of the 
Face is so rare in everyday life.16 It occurs only in those unique situations, wherein subjects 
expose themselves to each other in the proximity of their passivity. Levinas’ examples are 
different intimate relations such as the mother and the child or two lovers. However, it is 
important to emphasize that he uses the expression proximity not only in metaphorical, but 
literal sense as well. He refers to caress or embrace as the par excellence characteristics of 
proximity, that is, he considers the expression of elementary responsibility depending on 
circumstances of the subject’s bodily connection (Levinas 1998: 80, 82, 90). In this sense 
caress and embrace are tools of slashing the drape of the socially determined order of bodies, 
that is, a chance of conjuring the elementary responsibility in the place of the cognitive 
concepts of justice.17  
 
 
Coordinating action coordination and the Face of the Other 
 
After outlining the most important ideas of Levinas, we can return to the original line of 
thought and try to answer the question how the transition between different concepts of 
justice is possible. Although Levinas and Habermas are two major figures in continental 
philosophy, only a few attempts have been made to combine their ideas.18 Probably the 
difference of their theoretical goals and their terminology is responsible for this lack. To 
                                                 
15 In passivity the psyche of the subject is expressed, more precisely it is born in this exposition. Accordingly 
Bergo describes the Otherwise than Being as a “psyche-analysis” emphasizing the parallel of the Freudian and 
Levinasian ideas (2005:.122). 
16 Even if in everyday situations it is usually a cognitive concept of justice that determines the relation of two 
subjects, it is crucial to return to the experience of elementary responsibility from time to time, because without 
it, the former becomes empty as well. Accordingly there is a continuous oscillation between the two levels 
(Simmons 1999: 84). 
17 The evoking of elementary responsibility seems even more difficult if we think about Foucault’s analysis, 
which inform us about the penetration of the power/knowledge into the domain of the elementary, intimate 
relations (1990). 
18 However, in the recent past more and more effort has been made to fill this gap. In the first place the works of 
Hendley have to be mentioned, who has made many important contributions to synthetize the Habermasian and 
Levinasian ideas from a moral philosophical perspective. He argues that as Habermas and Levinas grasp the two 
sides of the same coin (the problem of moral significance of language), their ideas complete each other in many 
ways (Hendley 1996, 2000). In addition to Hendley’s work a few other contributions might be mentioned: 
Vetlesen elaborates a comparison of the two moral philosophical concepts (1997), Smith analyses the role of the 
Levinasian ideas played in the “philosophical discourse of modernity” (2008). 
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overcome these difficulties and to prepare the fusion of the two concepts, first their different 
and similar aspects have to be clearly formulated.  
Levinas is interested in the foundation of an ethical phenomenology, while Habermas’ main 
concern is a critical social theory grounded on the level of formal pragmatics. In these 
different theoretical settings they both touch upon the problem of the concepts of justice. 
However they approach it from different directions, with different purposes in mind: Levinas 
is interested in the fundamental level underlying the concepts of justice, while Habermas is 
interested in the role of the concepts of justice played in speech acts. In Habermas’ theory the 
concepts of justice are the final grounds of speech acts as they determine the order of 
justification (that is, in what situations/relations is a subject ready to justify her validity 
claims), which means they serve as explanans. For Levinas the concepts of justice are not the 
final grounds, but the cognitive limitations of the elementary ethical meaning, the absolute 
responsibility, which means that they are only derived meanings serving as explanandum.  
In this sense the two theories are complementary: Levinas discusses the origins of those 
concepts of justice that Habermas leans on, and conversely Habermas elaborates how the 
concepts of justice contribute directly to the order of speech acts (and indirectly to the 
reproduction of the lifeworld) that Levinas ignores.19 The two complementary theories are 
based on two different models of meaning-formation. For Habermas meaning-formation is an 
intentional linguistic interaction. For Levinas it is imperative to escape the frames of 
intentionality as it prevents the perception of the Face in its pure form, independent from 
socially influenced meanings.20 So Levinas describes a pre-intentional alternative of 
meaning-formation, which is not based on activity (interaction), but on the passivity of 
subjects and the proximity constituted by this passivity.  
I concluded the section of the paradox of coordinating action coordination in the hope that a 
pre-intentional process producing moral meanings of alternative source but equivalent 
capacity may solve the paradox. Now that the introduction of such a mechanism and the 
preparations of the synthesis have been done, the details of the solution may be elaborated. 
As described above, the paradox raises at the point where an attempt is made to describe the 
action coordination process within which a higher level concept of justice is formulated. This 
meaning-formation process is necessarily in accordance with the original, narrower concept 
of justice, and because of this the new, broader concept can be justified only according to the 
narrow one, which causes a performative contradiction. To evade this dead-end the phase of a 
pre-intentional meaning-formation process (expressing a concept of justice according to a 
high level of moral development) has to be built into the process of transition. 
Interpreting this problem in the Levinasian frames may offer a solution. If the actors trying to 
coordinate their action coordination evoke the circumstances wherein the elementary 
responsibility may be expressed (that is, if they enter into proximity), a high level, consensual 
morality becomes accessible. The elementary responsibility is an “original impression” 
(“Urimpression”), and as such, if conjured, it overwrites the validity of any other cognitive 
concepts of justice. However, as elementary responsibility is absolute, it needs to be limited. 
                                                 
19 Hendley arrives to a similar conclusion on a different way (2004). His starting point is Taylor’s critique of the 
discourse ethics, because of its incapability to answer the question “why to be good?” (1991). Hendley treats 
Levinas’ ideas as answers to this question: “The position I have been arguing for is (…) implying only that a 
fully intelligible appropriation of the procedural demands of communicative action would be impossible for 
someone not capable of this [Levinasian] form of sensibility” (Hendley 2004: 169). In accordance with 
Hendley’s point of view it may be added, that the complementarity is mutual, as Habermas answers questions in 
return that Levinas ignores.  
20 In order to explain the origins of morality Levinas had to find an empirical source of ethical meanings, which 
is independent from the intentional, socially constructed ethical meanings. And it was exactly the introduction of 
an alternative, pre-intentional process of meaning-formation that allowed Levinas to reconstruct the frames of a 
universal, “original impression”, “Urimpression” in the Husserlian terminology (MacAvoy 2005: 109-118). 
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Therefore the elementary responsibility implicates its transformation into a cognitive concept 
of justice. Furthermore elementary responsibility is equivalent of the concept of justice 
according to the highest level of moral development, and as such, it provides the basis for the 
most rational action coordination process, the undistorted communicative action.21 To 
conclude, it may be useful to summarize these features of elementary responsibility: firstly, 
expressed in proximity, as an alternative concept of justice it may establish the frames of a 
process of action coordination; secondly, because of its absoluteness, elementary 
responsibility includes the urge to be transformed into a cognitive concept of justice; thirdly, 
as it is expressed through pre-intentional processes and as it expresses a concept of justice 
according to the highest level of moral development, it is not encumbered with the paradox of 
the cognitive-linguistic model.  
Therefore, by building the phase of evoking the elementary responsibility into the description 
of the coordination of action coordination, its paradox may be dissolved and an expanded 
model of action coordination may be outlined. 
 
Table 3: Expanded sequence of speech acts 
rounds/ speakers speaker “A”  speaker “B”  
1-3. rounds: the 
same as in Table 
2 
 …   









4. round   either resigns from communication 
or changes to open or hidden violence → 
willing interruption of communicative 
action → unsuccessful ending of 
communication 




either uses only 
cognitive 
argumentation → 
paradox shifting to 
broader concept of 
justice 
or evokes elementary 
responsibility → 
successful shifting to 
broader concept of 




Table 3 shows this expanded model of action coordination that includes the variations of 
coordinating action coordination as well. If a situation occurs in which an actor faces 
unwilling (dogmatic) interruption of communicative action, she has four options: either she 
treats the situation as hopeless and resigns from communication; or she changes to open or 
                                                 
21 The elementary responsibility implicates a maximal willingness to open oneself to the Other, which is a 
commitment to revalidate one’s meaning-structure in the light of the Other’s. As László Tengelyi argues the 
Levinasian elementary responsibility is in close connection with the Kantian categorical imperative as they are 
different sources of morality but none can be imagined without supposing the other (2004: 126). Furthermore 
Levin characterizes Levinas’ concept as the “embodiment of categorical imperative” (2001). Hendley in his 
above mentioned articles shows the same thing in case of the undistorted debate of discourse ethics, which is not 
surprising as it is the reformulation of the moral law within the frames of formal pragmatics (2004: 159-160). 
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hidden violence; or she tries to establish a broader moral order within which the 
communication may be continued in a purely cognitive manner resulting in a paradox; or she 
attempts to establish the broader moral order in an action coordination whose moral basis is 
none other than the elementary responsibility resulting in a potential success. In this model 
the Levinasian and Habermasian elements constitute a coherent unity. The pre-intentional 
meaning-formation is needed to broaden the narrow scope of a theory working solely with a 
concept of cognitive meaning-formation. Conversely, the cognitive model of moral 
development is needed to explain the potential translations of the elementary responsibility 
into different concepts of justice. In this sense only the complementarity of the two levels of 
meaning-formation explains fully the problem of coordinating action coordination.22  
At this point it is useful to return one last time to the example of the older worker (third level 
of moral development) and the newcomer (second level of moral development). Their dissent 
may be solved if in the first step the elder worker – by a friendly gesture (for example a 
friendly tapping on the newcomer’s shoulder) – tries to evoke proximity, and wake the 
elementary responsibility. If he succeeds, then the circumstances of a quality debate are 
ensured, enabling him to argue that it is not the interest, but the responsibility toward the 
other that justifies the recognition of roles. In this way the newcomer acquires the new, 
broader concept of justice in a dialogue whose concept of justice is broad; and by applying 
the new concept of justice, the original debate may be recast without the chance of 
interruption, that is, the action coordination becomes coordinated. 
This conclusion is the answer to our starting question, how the elementary ethics and the 
cognitive concepts of justice may be connected? Their synthesis provides an opportunity to 
give a more complete description of action coordination mechanisms, and to expand the 
frames of the phenomenological concept of The Theory of Communicative Action into a 





In the concluding section, I would like to briefly indicate the stakes of the above line of 
thought and illuminate some of its broader consequences. Communicative action is the 
central notion of Habermas’s theory, so its modification affects his whole system of thought. 
The relevance of coordinating action coordination for social integration has to be indicated. 
Habermas starts Between Facts and Norms with the observation that the late modern societies 
are burdened with the tendency of gradual pluralization of lifeworlds, which endangers the 
social integration of society. Therefore, he concludes that the need for legal social integration 
grows as well (Habermas 1996: 26-27). I think that this observation is hardly disputable, 
unlike the conclusion, which might have several alternatives. The coordination of action 
coordination is such an alternative, as it is also an answer to the challenge of the lifeworld 
pluralization, however not a legal theoretic but an action theoretic one. Accordingly, the 
integration problems being implied by lifeworld pluralization – common in multicultural 
societies – can be solved not just by legal social integration but by the coordination of action 
coordination as well.  
Secondly, it has to be emphasized that the coordination of action coordination has 
consequences not just for social integration but for socialization as well. Communicative 
                                                 
22 Obviously at this point there are many empirical and theoretical questions, which require further analysis. As 
the elementary responsibility is the result of passivity, instead of intentional preconditions, those contextual 
factors need to be identified, which may ensure its emergence. Also those mechanisms need to be analyzed in 
further researches, which are responsible for translating the elementary experiences of responsibility into 
concepts of justice.  
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action is the complementary and, at the same time, reproduction mechanism of the lifeworld. 
It becomes necessary if the lifeworld does not ensure the horizon of mutual meanings. Then, 
it solves the problem in the particular action situation and, at the same time, reproduces the 
lifeworld by creating a new horizon. The connection between coordinating action 
coordination and action coordination is analogous with the connection between action 
coordination and the lifeworld. Coordinating action coordination becomes necessary if action 
coordination is not functioning, that is, if it cannot ensure the recreation of a new horizon of 
meaning. Then, the coordination of action coordination solves the problem in the particular 
situation and “reproduces” a new habit of action coordination at the same time by practicing 
it. As the obstruction of action coordination becomes a more and more frequent problem in 
the individualized, differentiated late modernity, the questions of coordinating action 
coordination become more and more important for a late modern theory of socialization. 
Only such a theory is capable of highlighting potential solutions for the new challenges 
arising because of the dissolution of a mutual lifeworld. 
Thirdly, the consequences concerning Habermas’s normative basis have to be mentioned. 
The original normative basis in The Theory of Communicative Action is the undistorted series 
of speech acts (introduced in Table 1). However, this highly rational type of action 
coordination is itself a result of a socialization process, including a moral development that 
leans on the Levinasian proximity. Therefore, the pragmatic normative basis is indirectly 
dependent on the proximity, which means that lack of proximity could be rightfully criticized 
in the relevant situations. In this sense, Habermas’s formal pragmatic normative basis can be 
complemented on the level of socialization theory with the concept of proximity. 
Finally, the theoretical consequence has to be mentioned, namely the one that concerns the 
historical conclusions and the diagnosis of time of The Theory of Communicative Action. As 
it is well known, Habermas describes three major trends of social evolution: the 
rationalization of lifeworld, the differentiation of the systems, and the uncoupling of the 
lifeworld and system. Furthermore, as a diagnosis of time, he describes the colonization of 
the lifeworld by the system introducing it as a pathological tendency. In the light of what has 
been told about the coordination of action coordination, these ideas may be revised as well. 
As the proximity is an essential prerequisite of coordinating action coordination, which is the 
prerequisite of the rationalization of the lifeworld, it becomes a crucial question regarding 
how proximity can be historically featured and how its historical dynamism affects the 
original Habermasian diagnosis of time.23 Even if these questions require further research and 
may only be mentioned here, it is important to emphasize their relevance, as they are crucial 
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